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Abstract
This paper analyzes the determinants of interest margins in the
Colombian Financial System. Based on the model by Ho and Saun-
ders (1981), interest margins are modelled as a function of the pure
spread and bank-speci¯c institutional imperfections using quarterly
data for the period 1994:IV-2005:III. Additionally, the pure spread is
estimated as a function of market power and interest rate volatility.
Results indicate that interest margins are mainly a®ected by credit
institutions' ine±ciency and to a lesser extent by credit risk exposure
and market power. This implies that public policies should be ori-
ented towards creating the necessary market conditions for banks to
enhance their e±ciency.
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11 Introduction
The present paper is focused on modelling the interest margin of credit insti-
tutions, considering the e®ect of variables related to risk, market competition
and operational and intermediation costs.
Based on the model developed by Ho and Saunders (1981), banks are
modelled as dealers in the credit market acting as intermediaries between
suppliers and demanders of ¯nancial funds. The interest margin that results
of the bank's maximization problem is a function of the degree of market
competition and interest rate volatility.
However, this paper di®ers from the aforementioned work, both in the
estimation techniques used in the empirical tests as well as in the variables
used to determine interest margins. Speci¯cally, Lerner (1981) comments
how the original paper by Ho and Saunders (1981) does not include any type
of intermediation costs by the bank di®erent from traditional ¯nancial costs1.
Wong (1997) explicitly introduces exploitation costs in the explanation of the
interest margin as does the model in this paper when estimating the latter.
More importantly, the theoretical model here used includes an asset and
an interbank market, as well as a market structure which resembles a model
of monopolistic competition with product di®erentiation, given that agents
cannot willingly substitute one bank for another. In this sense, the model
here presented can be viewed as an extension of the original model, such as
has been done by Allen (1988), McShane and Sharpe (1985) and Angbazo
(1997), among others.
Identifying the determinants of interest margins in Colombia is a rel-
evant public policy issue, since monetary authorities are concerned about
the e±ciency and competitiveness of the payment system and the degree of
¯nancial depth. Therefore, policy recommendations oriented towards achiev-
ing a lower interest margin can be derived once the main factors a®ecting
the spread are determined.
This paper will focus on the microeconomic determinants of interest mar-
1Other intermediation costs include expenses related with enhancing existing costumer-
bank relationships and attracting new clients (e.g. o®ering di®erent goods for opening
new accounts or getting credit cards, among others). Such expenses could lead banks to
increase their margin in order to compensate for the additional cost.
2gins, in order to capture the heterogeneity between credit institutions. No
macroeconomic variables are included in the determination of interest mar-
gins, since changes in the former should be captured in changes in bank-
speci¯c variables. For instance, the ¯nancial liberalization process that the
Colombian Financial System has undergone in the past years must re°ect
changes in banks e±ciency.
Using a two step estimation approach, in which the interest margin is ¯rst
estimated, using an unbalanced ¯xed e®ects panel data with a time-varying
intercept, as a function of the pure spread (the intercept in the regression)
and four microeconomic variables (credit risk, operational costs, opportunity
costs and net commissions). In the second step, the estimated pure spread
is regressed against interest rate volatility and market power following the
theoretical model using Recursive OLS estimates.
The ¯rst step results indicate that the interest margin is positively and
highly a®ected by ine±ciency (i.e. operational costs) both for the Financial
System as a whole and for Commercial and Mortgage banks. It is also found
that the other intermediation costs are substitutes of interest rates for banks
and complementary for other credit institutions, since the latter operate in
more specialized markets. Finally, the estimated pure spread is also found
to be a determinant of interest margins and closely follows its evolution.
In the second step regression market power is found to directly a®ect
the pure spread. This indicates that market power is also a determinant
of interest margins through its e®ect on the pure spread. However, this
methodology does not allow to quantify this e®ect.
The paper is organized as follows: The theoretical model is developed
in section two. The third section presents a review of the evolution of the
main interest margin determinants. The two step empirical estimation and
its results are presented in section four. The last section concludes.
32 The Model
Based on the model developed by Ho and Saunders (1981), banks are viewed
as risk adverse intermediaries between demanders and suppliers of funds2.
When undertaking this role, the bank faces an important uncertainty. Mainly,
that deposit supply in°ows arrive at di®erent moments in time from loan de-
mand out°ows. This generates a cost for the intermediary, given that it
will have to hold either a long or short position in the money market, being
therefore exposed to changes in this market's rate (i.e. interest rate risk)3.
Loans and deposits arrive at di®erent moments in time, although both
are assumed to have the same maturity date (i.e. after the end of the
decision period). Additionally, they are assumed to be long-term operations,
contrary to the short-term money market where investment and borrowing
mature at the end of the decision period. This di®erence in maturity in fund
sources for the bank, creates exposure to interest rate risk. Such risk will be
faced whenever the intermediary has an unmatched portfolio of deposits and
loans at the end of the decision period and the money market rate changes4.
Suppose a new deposit (loan) is contracted at a long-term interest rate RD
(RL). If this deposit (loan) arrives earlier than a new loan (deposit), the
bank will have to invest (borrow) the funds at the short-term money market
rate r. In doing so, the bank faces a reinvestment (re¯nancing) risk at the
end of the decision period should the short-term rate, r, fall (rise).
Therefore, Financial Intermediaries will transfer these ¯nancial costs,
2Financial Intermediaries' risk aversion can be explained by di®erent factors: First of
all, pro¯t (and thus wealth) volatility, can cause greater costs associated with its adminis-
tration. Second, guarantees required by Financial Authorities, such as deposit insurance,
may lead banks to limit their willingness to engage in risky activities. Finally, banks op-
erating in non competitive systems, with a certain degree of market power, may give up
greater bene¯ts associated with a higher exposure to risk, therefore concentrating their
lending portfolio. This type of behavior is widely analyzed in what is known as agency
problems.
3Note that this exposure exists due to the fact that banks do not need deposits to grant
loans, since funds can be borrowed from the money market.
4Such interest rate risk is explained in the literature by what is denominated as
mismatching in ¯nancial intermediation operations. This phenomena is explained only
by the di®erence in timing in which loans and deposits arrive for each bank during the
period of analysis, since the model does not take into account the possibility of di®erent
maturities between instruments.
4which arise from the uncertainty in the provision of deposit and loan op-
erations (i.e. fees for administering ¯nancial resources), to economic agents.
Consequently, each bank participates in the market by setting a loan and
deposit interest rate, RL and RD, that depends on these ¯nancial costs:
RDi = r ¡ ai ; RLi = r + bi (1)
where r is the expected interest rate in the money market, while ai and
bi are the ¯nancial costs associated with the provision of loans and deposits
for bank i, respectively.
After the bank sets its interest rates it takes a passive role in the market.
In other words, the bank waits for loans and deposits to arrive randomly at
di®erent times. The former are modelled as Poisson processes with prob-
abilities ¸Li and ¸Di, respectively. Linear functions are considered for the
determination of these variables. The main di®erence of this model with the
one proposed by Ho and Saunders (1981) is that a di®erent speci¯cation for
these parameters is considered. In this case, bank i competes with other
banks by setting its ¯nancial costs over loans and deposits, bi and ai, taking
into account those charged by its competitors. Hence, the probabilities of
granting a credit or receiving a deposit are given by5:












This approach can be considered as a version of the original model in
which product di®erentiation by banks is taken into account 6. Additionally,
banks have a certain degree of market power in the loan and deposit markets,
given that agents cannot freely choose their bank nor can they perfectly
5Ho and Saunders (1981) assume a symmetric linear speci¯cation in which ¸D = ®¡¯a
and ¸L = ®¡¯b. In this case there exists one monopolist bank which ¯xes a and b. Given
these costs, economic agents will randomly o®er and demand funds.
6See Shubik (1980).
5substitute between them7.
Probabilities ¸Li and ¸Di are decreasing functions of the ¯nancial costs
charged by each bank and a positive function of those charged by competing
institutions. The ® > 0 parameter is the probability of arrival of deposits and
loans in a market were all banks have the same cost structure (i.e. charge the
same a and b). The ¯ > 0 parameter represents the degree of substitution
between ¯nancial costs charged by banks. A higher ¯ implies a higher degree
of substitution between the values of a and b set by di®erent institutions.
Consequently, the value of ¯ re°ects the market power of bank i, since it can
charge a higher ¯nancial cost than its competitors and still have a probability
di®erent from zero of receiving (granting) funds.
For simplicity, new loans and deposits all have the same positive size
Q and the same duration, thus avoiding transformation problems that may
arise between assets and liabilities. Each bank is interested in the di®erence
between loans and deposits (Li ¡ Di) = Ii, which is interpreted as the net
credit inventory. A one-period decision model is assumed, in which banks
maximize their expected utility as a function of terminal wealth.
In what follows, the determination of interest margins in the case where
N banks, identical with respect to their degree of risk aversion, but di®erent
in their cost structure, will be analyzed8. Furthermore, the e®ect of mergers
over interest margins will be discussed.
2.1 Intermediation Model with Identical Banks
In this section, banks are assumed to have an identical and constant risk aver-
sion coe±cient. Thus, the problem is solved for bank i taking into account
that wealth is represented by three components: the net credit inventory
(Li¡Di) = Ii, the short-run position in the money market, Mi, and a diversi-
7In practice, various reasons can explain this limited substitution: the long-lasting
relationship between banks and their clients, the degree of bank specialization in certain
operations, and the strategies followed by banks in di®erent geographic zones.
8In this model, only the costs arising from administering funds under uncertainty are
considered. A more complete model could also include operational costs (other costs
directly related to the intermediation activity di®erent from the ¯nancial costs de¯ned
here). See Fernandez (2002) for an analysis in which such intermediation costs are also
included.
6¯ed portfolio of liquid investments °i. Mi is de¯ned as the di®erence between
supply and demand of liquidity in the interbank market: Mi = MS
i ¡ MD
i ,
both of which mature at the end of the decision period. In this way, a bank
can have a short position in the money market if this di®erence is negative
(need to fund loans), and a long position if the di®erence is positive (need
to invest excess liquidity). Nonetheless, the bank approaches this market
only when there are imbalances in his net credit inventory, since funds lent
or deposited in the credit market are more pro¯table. °i, on the other hand,
is an exogenous portfolio of liquid investments that constitutes part of the
banks base or initial wealth at the beginning of the decision period.
As mentioned above, in this model loans and deposits have the same
maturity in one period of time, implying that the net credit position will be
subject to interest rate risk since rates on loans and deposits are not ¯xed
simultaneously. Hence, bank i will participate in the market by setting a
loan and deposit interest rate, RL and RD, that depends on the fees arising
from administering loan and deposit operations under this uncertainty. From
equation (1), the interest margin can be de¯ned as:
RLi ¡ RDi = ai + bi
Bank i ¯xes the values of ai and bi that maximize the expected utility as
a function of expected wealth at the end of the period.
As bank i is risk averse, its utility function is assumed to be of the mean-
variance type 9:
9
This is equivalent to maximizing a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) or exponen-
tial utility function when the returns are normally distributed. For example: Assume a
negative exponential utility function of the form
U(W) = ¡e¡½W
Terminal wealth W has a normal distribution with mean ¹ and standard deviation ¾.
Using the generalized method of moments (GMM) for a normal distribution, a utility
function that depends on the mean and the variance of wealth is obtained:
EU(W) = E[¡e¡½W] = ¡e[¡½(¹¡ 1
2½¾

















Total wealth (f Wi) at the end of the period is de¯ned as:
f Wi = °i (1 + e r°) + Mi (1 + r) + Ii (1 + e rI) (4)
Where, e r°;r;e rI are the interest rates associated with the returns on in-
vestments, the money market and net credit operations10, and where ½i is
the risk aversion coe±cient for bank i.
Using (3) and (4), Ui is obtained as a function of Ii and Mi:


















r° = E (e r°); rI = E (e rI); ¾2
° = var(e r°); ¾2
I = var(e rI); ¾°I = cov (e r°;e rI).











Equation (6) includes each of the determinants of the pure interest mar-
gin: The ¯rst term, captures the e®ect of the level of competition in the
market over the pure spread. That is, as in the original model, ®=¯ mea-
sures the e®ect of the elasticities of supply and demand. A higher value of
10McShane and Sharpe (1985) consider a model in which banks' wealth is only repre-
sented by the position in the money market M and by the net credit inventory I. The
results do not di®er much from those found in these paper.
11Following Ho and Saunders (1981), in this paper the pure spread represents the frac-
tion of interest margins that is not a®ected by certain institutional imperfections. In fact,
this margin exists solely due to the fact that there is transactions uncertainty.
12See the theoretical appendix for a detailed analysis on the derivation of the pure
spread.
8this ratio implies that the bank faces more inelastic supply and demand func-
tions. This version di®ers from the Ho and Saunders (1981) model in that
market power is also a®ected by the number of institutions in the banking
sector N=(N ¡ 1). If banks where risk neutral, pure interest margins would
only be a®ected by the level of competition. In this approximation, mergers
have a positive e®ect over the pure spread. When mergers occur, the number
of institutions falls causing a rise in the pure interest margin.
The second term of the equation shows that the pure spread is positively
a®ected by the institutions attitude towards risk.
Thus, the pure interest margin depends positively on the risk aversion
coe±cient (½i) and interest rate volatility (¾2
i) and negatively on the number
of institutions and the degree of elasticity of supply and demand curves. It is
worth noting that in the second term of the equation, the pure spread seems
to be negatively a®ected by the money market interest rate r. However,
it must be taken into account that since the money market interest rate
a®ects both loan and deposit rates, it also a®ects ¾2
i, hence the net e®ect is
ambiguous13.
3 Evolution of Interest Margin Determinants
In this section, the evolution of the main variables used to estimate interest
margins is described. Mean levels of all variables refer to weighted averages14
and standard deviations are included to allow for a measure of dispersion
between groups.
The di®erent variables show similar trends both for the Total Financial
System and for Commercial and Mortgage Banks. As shown in Table 1, the
mean interest margin level is currently below the pre-crisis period (before
1998), although its standard deviation has increased in the last years. As
can be seen in Figure 1, the interest margin has not been steadily falling
since the early 90's. In fact, it started to increase since 2002, a trend that
13For a detailed analysis on the e®ect of the money market rate on the pure spread see
Wong (1997). Speci¯cally, the author states that the e®ect of an increase in r is either
positive or ambiguous depending on whether the bank is a net borrower or lender in the
interbank market, respectively, as well as on the size of the income and substitution e®ects.
14All variables are weighted by size, as explained in the following section.
9was reversed during 2004 until ¯nally stabilizing around 9% during 2005.
Credit risk shows the most interesting behavior of all variables, present-
ing a sharp increase in the crisis period followed by falling levels which are
now similar to those present before 1998. Banks mean credit risk level is not
below the pre-crisis period due to the inclusion of Mortgage Banks in the
calculations, whose portfolio was the most sensitive during the crisis. How-
ever, their current portfolio diversi¯cation and the increase in the issue of
mortgage backed securities have decreased their exposure towards this risk.
Additionally, improvements in credit risk in the last year are also explained
by the good domestic macroeconomic situation and healthier debtors' bal-
ance sheets.
The e±ciency measure (ine±ciency) shows a similar trend to that of credit
risk, increasing sharply during the crisis period and decreasing afterwards.
The fact that mean levels of operational costs over assets are at their his-
torical lows, implies that ¯nancial institutions have experienced positive ef-
¯ciency innovations in their cost structure.
The interesting fact about the net commissions over assets ratio15 is that
banks seems to charge, on average, higher exploitation costs as shown in the
weighted average of this variable in Table 1. This could be in line with the
assumption that in more competitive markets, commissions might act as a
substitute of interest rates.
The reserves over assets ratios has been decreasing since the 1990's and
continues with this trend during the ¯rst half of this decade. This behavior
is explained by the decline in the reserve requirement coe±cient that the
Central Bank imposes on ¯nancial institutions.
Finally, real total assets and equity decreased sharply during the crisis, as
shown in Table 2. However, average assets and equity did not plummet in this
period since the fall in the total value of the variables was overcompensated
by the decrease in the number of institutions. In 2005, the level of real total
assets is greater than the pre-crisis period, while real equity is still below the
levels of the mid nineties.
15Net commission expenses are de¯ned as the di®erence between commission income
and expenses.
10Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: 1996-2005
Financial System
Dic-96 Dic-99 Dic-02 Sep-05
Interest Margin Mean 0.102 0.086 0.088 0.089
Std. Dev 0.055 0.067 0.061 0.058
Credit Risk Mean 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.02
Std. Dev 0.052 0.176 0.052 0.052
Reserves/Assets Mean 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03
Std. Dev 0.031 0.022 0.020 0.018
Operational Costs/Assets Mean 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06
Std. Dev 0.034 0.037 0.034 0.032
Net Comissions/Assets Mean 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Std. Dev 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.022
Commercial and Mortgage Banks
Dic-96 Dic-99 Dic-02 Sep-05
Interest Margin Mean 0.111 0.094 0.095 0.093
Std. Dev 0.025 0.063 0.047 0.032
Credit Risk Mean 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.03
Std. Dev 0.021 0.292 0.018 0.025
Reserves/Assets Mean 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.04
Std. Dev 0.029 0.022 0.016 0.018
Operational Costs/Assets Mean 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06
Std. Dev 0.024 0.033 0.027 0.020
Net Comissions/Assets Mean 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Std. Dev 0.020 0.013 0.012 0.013
11Table 2: Assets and Equity:(millions of pesos of September 2005)
Total System
Dic-96 Dic-99 Dic-02 Sep-05
Total Assets 116,577 103,384 101,358 106,485
Average Assets 1,295 1,752 2,252 3,132
Equity 17,066 12,153 10,979 13,412
Average Equity 190 206 244 394
Commercial and Mortgage Banks
Dic-96 Dic-99 Dic-02 Sep-05
Total Assets 94,639 86,926 89,611 98,323
Average Assets 2,366 2,997 3,319 5,175
Equity 12,563 9,217 8,781 11,518
Average Equity 314 318 325 606











In this section the interest margin, the pure spread and market power are
estimated in two di®erent steps16. This two-step approach to panel data
on bank spreads has also been used by McShane and Sharpe (1985) Allen
(1988), Angbazo (1997), Wong (1997) and Saunders and Schumacher (2000).
Aside from this study, only the paper by Brock and Rojas (2000) has
tackled the issue of interest margins using a two-step approach for the case
of Colombia17. Speci¯cally, their analysis shows that both high levels of
operating costs and non-performing loans raise interest spreads. In addition,
reserve requirements act as a tax on banks that gets translated into a higher
spread.
Other studies of bank interest margins in the Colombian Financial Sys-
tem present a di®erent approach. Salazar (2005) estimates a linear equation
using a time series analysis for the aggregate of the banking sector to iden-
tify the determinants of interest margins (no market power variable is used
in this approach). Barajas et al. (1999), on the other hand, use both a Full
Information Maximum Likelihood procedure, to jointly estimate a spread
equation and a demand function for loans, and a Random Coe±cients Model
using Panel Data for 22 banks, in which the spread equation alone is esti-
mated. The former, ¯nds that ¯nancial repression is a main determinant of
the high levels of interest margins. The latter, establishes that interest mar-
gins have become more responsive to loan quality (i.e. credit risk). However,
both studies coincide in that interest spreads are highly sensitive to bank
e±ciency.
This paper, contrary to the papers mentioned above for Colombia, will
not only focus on the determinants of interest margins, but on those of the
16In this paper this approach is used in order to analyze the evolution of pure spreads.
Other studies by Fernandez (2002) and Maudos and Fernandez (2002), estimate interest
margins in a one step regression using proxies of determinants of this variable, both from
the theoretical model as well as other variables which are assumed to a®ect margins, which
does not allow this type of analysis.
17Although their paper does not only focus in the case of Colombia, but other Latin
American Countries as well
13pure spread as well. Given that the latter is a determinant of interest mar-
gins, and that market power's evolution in explaining the pure spread is also
estimated, the dynamic relationship between interest margins and market
power is accounted for.
The estimation in this paper is as follows. In the ¯rst step, an unbalanced
panel of quarterly data for 85 ¯nancial institutions in the period 1994:IV-
2005:III18 is estimated to obtain the determinants of interest margins and
a series for the pure spread. In the second step, this series is used as a
dependent variable in a Recursive OLS estimation using macro data in order
to obtain the time-varying coe±cient of market power. Four di®erent types
of credit institutions are included in the estimation: Commercial Banks,
Mortgage Banks, Commercial Finance Corporations and Investment Banks.
Since all these institutions vary importantly both between and within groups,
the data was weighted by size19 in order to control the bias that many small
institutions may induce on the estimation. Additionally, the exercise was
replicated using only Commercial and Mortgage Banks, since these sectors
are most relevant in the Colombian Financial System.





However, this interest margin is not strictly the same pure spread de¯ned
in the theoretical model, since institutional imperfections generate additional
costs which may lead for implicit rates to include other interest expenses (or
mark-ups). To calculate the pure spread, such institutional imperfections
must be accounted for in the estimation of the interest margin. Following Ho
and Saunders (1981), the model estimated controls for credit risk, opportu-
nity cost and e±ciency. Also, this model controls for additional costs related
to the intermediation activity of ¯nancial institutions, which have become
increasingly important in the local market.




Opportunity Cost = Reserves at the Central Bank
Total Assets
18The data employed in the estimation comes from balance sheet data reported by
¯nancial institutions to the Financial Superintendency.
19Size is measured as the ratio between bank i's assets over total assets for a given year.
14Efficiency =
Operational and Labor Costs
Total Assets
Other Intermediation Costs =
Net Commission Expenses
Total Assets
Credit Risk is expected to have a positive impact on interest margins since
a greater exposure by ¯nancial intermediaries to this risk will be re°ected on
higher loan rates. The volume of reserves at the Central Bank also has a pos-
itive impact over interest margins given that it poses an opportunity cost to
the ¯nancial intermediaries by forcing them to deviate resources from poten-
tially more pro¯table activities. The e±ciency measure is expected to have
a positive impact on interest margins, given that higher administration costs
will be partially transferred to agents. Net commission expenses can have
either a positive or negative e®ect on interest margins, depending on whether
these expenses/pro¯ts are complementary or substitute, respectively, to the
interest rate20.
4.2 Estimating the Interest Margin
As mentioned above, the interest spread calculated from balance sheet data,
di®ers from the pure spread derived in the theoretical model due to certain
institutional imperfections. Thus, prior to estimating the determinants of the
pure spread, this variable must be obtained from an estimation of interest
margins.
The implicit assumption is therefore, that at any moment in time, bank
interest margins are a function of the pure spread plus additional mark-ups
due to institutional imperfections (Credit Risk, Opportunity Cost, E±ciency
and Other Intermediation Costs). Following Ho and Saunders (1981), it is
assumed that if banks share a similar market structure, attitudes towards
risk and interest rate volatility, their pure spreads will be practically the
20In a highly competitive market, where banks cannot perfectly ¯x their interest rates,
commission expenses are expected to be a substitute of interest rates. On the other hand,
markets in which institutions have a certain degree of market power, due for example to
product di®erentiation, will be characterized by complementary commission expenses and
interest rates.
15same. Given this, it is possible to approximate the interest margin by the
following equation:
IMit = µ0t + µ1CRit + µ2OCit + µ3Effit + µ4Comit + "it (7)
Where µ0t is the pure spread which varies over time but not across indi-
viduals, CRit is credit risk, OCit is opportunity cost Effit is the measure of
e±ciency and Comit are net commission expenses for bank i at time t. The
model is estimated using an unbalanced panel ¯xed e®ects regression with a
variable intercept over time (but constant across individuals)21. It is worth
noting that this estimation technic di®ers signi¯cantly from that of Ho and
Saunders (1981) where the pure spread series was constructed from di®erent
cross section regressions for each period of time.
Results are presented for both the total of the Financial System as well
as only for Commercial and Mortgage Banks in Table 3.
All variables are signi¯cant at the 1% level except the opportunity cost
variable in the Total System (TS) regression. The credit risk and e±ciency
coe±cients present the expected sign, implying that a higher exposure to
credit risk and greater ine±ciency e®ectively raises the interest margin. The
net commissions coe±cient presents a negative sign, implying that these
expenses are a substitute to interest rates in the Colombian Financial System.
In the Only Banks (OB) regression results are very similar, although in
the case of the opportunity cost variable, the coe±cient is signi¯cant and
has the expected sign. The net commissions coe±cient is also a substitute
of interest rates in this sub-sample.
It is worth noting that when a model for Commercial Finance Corpo-
rations and Finance Banks is estimated, the net commissions coe±cient is
positive and signi¯cant at the 1% level, indicating complementarity among
this variable and interest rates. This result is not surprising since many
of these institutions are concentrated in very speci¯c markets, which allows
them to exercise a higher degree of market power compared to banks.
Concerning the intercept of the regression, it is worth mentioning that
the output reports an overall value, which is not the average of the ¯xed
e®ects "estimates". The estimated intercepts (i.e. the pure spread at each
21See Econometric Appendix for estimation details.
16Table 3: Estimation Results
Total Financial System
Interest Margin Coef. Std. Error P-Value
Constant 0.0002 0.000 0.000
Credit Risk 0.1600 0.010 0.000
Reserves/Assets -0.0111 0.017 0.508
Operational Costs/Assets 1.2024 0.035 0.000




No. Of Obs. 2,755
No. Of Groups 103
Commercial and Mortgage Banks
Interest Margin Coef. Std. Error P-Value
Constant 0.0233 0.005 0.000
Credit Risk 0.1571 0.016 0.000
Reserves/Assets 0.3893 0.030 0.000
Operational Costs/Assets 0.6483 0.066 0.000




No. Of Obs. 1,392
No. Of Groups 46
17moment in time) are presented in the next subsection.
As a ¯nal remark with respect to these estimations, it is important to
note that the e±ciency variable presented the highest estimated coe±cients
in both regressions, indicating that ¯nancial institutions transfer a large part
of their administrative costs to interest margins. These result is consistent
with what is found by Salazar (2005),Brock and Rojas (2000) and Barajas et
al. (1999), where e±ciency was also a key determinant of interest margins.
Concerning public policy, this result implies that authorities should direct
their e®orts to creating the basic market conditions needed for banks to
enhance their e±ciency.
4.3 Calculating the Pure Spread
The pure spread is the estimated constant coe±cient of the above regressions.
Given that this coe±cient varies over time, it is possible to construct a series
of the pure spread as follows:
µ0t = ¹ Yt ¡ µ0 ¹ Xt
Where ¹ Yt = 1
N
PN




The evolution of the pure spread of TS and OB over time is presented in
Figure 2.
As can be seen, the level of the pure spread is always inferior to that of
the interest margin, which implies that institutional imperfections faced by
credit intermediaries e®ectively represent a positive mark-up. Additionally,
the evolution of the pure spread follows closely that of the interest margin,
indicating that this variable is fundamental in explaining the latter. However,
in the last year the interest margin has slightly decreased while the pure
spread shows an increase, thus the behavior of the former is mainly explained
in this period by the lower levels of credit risk and the recent improvements
in e±ciency.
4.4 Calculating Market Power
As stated in the theoretical model, the pure interest margin is a function of
market power and interest rate volatility. Following Ho and Saunders (1981),
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19a model to calculate market power can be derived from an estimation of the
pure spread22 of the form:
µ0t = ±0 + ±1¾
2












t is de¯ned in the theoretical model as the volatility of the net credit
inventory I interest rate. In order to capture this, the model was estimated
using the volatility of the monthly exante interest margin23. Since the last
volatility measure may have certain problems (i.e. di®erent maturities of
loans and deposits, whereas the theoretical model assumes the same matu-
rity for both) a second estimation was performed using the volatility of the
weekly Interbank Interest Rate (TIB) as a proxy of ¾2
t. It is reasonable to
use the volatility of the TIB as a proxy of the volatility of the Net Credit
Inventory interest rate, given that the interbank, loan and deposit markets
are closely linked. Hence, variations in the TIB directly translate into vari-
ations of the other interest rates. Results do not vary signi¯cantly between
both speci¯cations.
The model is estimated using Recursive OLS in order to obtain varying
coe±cients of market power, allowing an analysis of its evolution over time.
22Since the pure spread is estimated from a prior regression model, the dependent
variable of the second-step estimation will have a measurement error. However, when such
a problem arises in the dependent variable consequences are not serious. The standard
errors and tests will remain valid. However, the standard errors will tend to be larger than
they would have been if there had been no measurement error, resulting only on e±ciency
problems. But the larger error variance does not violate any of the assumptions needed
for OLS estimation. In fact, the OLS estimators are consistent (and possibly unbiased as
well). For further discussion see Wooldridge (2001).
23The exante interest margin is the di®erence between the marginal loan and deposit
rates, which are the rates at which banks grant new loans and receive new deposits,
respectively.
20As can be seen in Figure 3, both results (TS and OB) indicate that market
power seems to be closely linked to the pure spread.
Results are presented from the last quarter of 1997, given that ¯ndings
for these estimations for the ¯rst periods of time may be misleading, since
the coe±cients are calculated with few observations.
The increase in market power during the ¯rst years was accompanied by
an increase in the pure spread of 1.4 percentage points (pp). Market power
started to decrease since the beginning of 1997 coinciding with the entrance of
two major foreign banks (BBVA and Banco Santander), which could indicate
an increase in competition. However, the fall in market power continued for
several years including the 1998-2000 crisis.
Even when deriving concrete conclusions from this period may be erratic,
the model may shed some light as to this decrease in market power. Al-
though the number of institutions fell dramatically during the crisis period
(i.e. N=(N ¡ 1) rises), this change is not induced by mergers, but by an
adverse economic situation. Since the theoretical model does not consider
the possibility of bankruptcy (i.e. a fall in N is only derived from a merger),
this component of market power is not readily ¯t to explain this speci¯c
situation. On the other hand, the model does capture changes in economic
conditions, which are re°ected in the elasticity of supply and demand (®=¯).
During a recession, when loan demand and deposit supply are expected to
be relatively more elastic (i.e. lower ®=¯), market power falls and so does
the pure spread, ceteris paribus. Again the fall in market power was in line
with a decrease in the pure interest margin, which fell from 2.3% in June
1997 to 0.5% in December 2002 (see Figure 3).
The decreasing trend of market power stopped at the beginning of 2003,
staying constant for almost a year. Starting 2004, market power began in-
creasing, while the pure spread started to rise since the beginning of 2003
(rising 1.1 pp till September 2005). The former may be due to important
mergers that have occurred during the last years, which is consistent with
what the theoretical model of the pure interest margin predicts. Nonethe-
less, stating that the increase in market power is only due to mergers would
be a bold statement, taking into account that the model here used has a
coe±cient of market power that may be capturing e®ects that are not easily
discriminated. Mainly, that the evolution of market power is closely related
to the economic cycle. Thus, in moments of economic growth, when loan
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22demand and deposit supply are relatively inelastic (i.e. a high ®=¯), market
power also increases.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the above result carries an important
implication in identifying the determinants of interest margins. In the pre-
vious subsection, the importance of the pure spread in explaining interest
margins was discussed. Thus, if market power is one of the driving forces
of the pure spread, it is reasonable to asses that it is also a determinant of
banks interest margins. However, quantifying the direct e®ect market power
has on the latter is beyond the scope of this analysis24.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper extends the Ho and Saunders (1981) model by including an asset
and an interbank market, as well as a market structure which resembles a
model of monopolistic competition with product di®erentiation. Addition-
ally, the estimation of the interest margin includes a new variable which
captures other costs associated with banks' commercial activities.
Results indicate that the interest margin is determined by operational
and other ¯nancial costs, which act as substitutes of interest rates for banks
and as a complementary for other credit institutions, as well as by credit
risk.
In all regressions, the most important of the microeconomic factors is
credit institutions' ine±ciency. This result is consistent with similar ¯nd-
ings by Salazar (2005), Brock and Rojas (2000) and Barajas et al. (1999),
where e±ciency was also a key determinant of interest spreads. This re-
sult is relevant for policy makers, since it implies that in order to achieve
lower interest margins, public policy should be oriented towards creating the
necessary market conditions for banks to enhance their e±ciency.
It is also found that interest margins are positively a®ected by the pure
spread, which is common for all institutions in each period of time.
Empirical exercises suggest that market power directly a®ects the pure
24The reason why this quanti¯cation cannot be carried out is simply that both coe±-
cients are estimated using two separate regression models, each with a di®erent econometric
technique.
23spread, as suggested by the theoretical model developed in section two. This
result indicates that market power is also a determinant of interest margins
through its e®ect on the pure spread.
The evolution of market power in the last years raises important issues
concerning the e®ect that mergers have in the Colombian Financial System,
as well as on the impact that changes in the business cycle, which a®ect
elasticity of deposit supply and loan demand, have on interest margins.
Concerning the e®ect mergers have on interest margins, it is important to
note that even when mergers could imply a higher degree of market power,
they could also be a source of higher e±ciency25. Results here found suggest
that e±ciency is the main determinant of interest margins, and therefore,
mergers which increase market power and improve e±ciency simultaneously,
could have a negative net impact on margins (i.e. may end up reducing it).
Therefore, future research should focus on the policies needed to e®ectively
generate the market conditions that may lead to a more e±cient payment
system.
25Estrada (2005) shows that for the Colombian case, mergers between big banks e®ec-
tively enhance e±ciency.
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27A Theoretical Appendix













At the end of the period, terminal wealth is represented by the returns on
held assets by bank i; ¯nancial, liquid and net credit inventory (Ii = Li¡Di),
where L are loans and D deposits:
f Wi = °i (1 + e r°) + Mi (1 + r) + Ii (1 + e rI) (10)
Using the last two expressions, and assuming that there exists at least
one loan and deposit transaction, utility for each bank can be calculated as
a function of Ii and Mi:

















When a bank attracts a new deposit, its utility is changed due to a mod-
i¯cation in its net credit position: Ii0 ¡ Q, where Q is the size of the new
deposit transaction. The new liquidity position for bank i will be given by
Mi0 + Q + Qai, which represents the initial money market position plus the
new deposit °ow plus the cost charged by the bank by the size of the deposit.
Substituting in 11 one has:
(4Ui=Deposit) = Ui(Ii ¡ Q;Mi + Q(1 + ai)) ¡ U(Ii;Mi)







2 ¡ 2QIi) ¡ 2¾°I°iQ]
(12)
Similarly, when a new loan is granted, the bank has a new net credit
inventory position Ii0 + Q, where Q stands for the size of the new credit
28transaction; the new money market position will then be given by Mi0 ¡
Q + Qbi, which just as in the prior case, also incorporates the size of the
credit transaction and the charges associated to it. Substituting in the utility
equation yields:
(4Ui=Loan) = Ui(Ii + Q;Mi ¡ Q(1 ¡ bi)) ¡ U(Ii;Mi)







2 + 2QIi) + 2¾°I°iQ]
(13)
If depositors and borrowers arrive randomly at bank i, following a Poisson
process, then ¸Di and ¸Li will be decreasing functions of the provision fees
ai and bi:








The optimum margin will be obtained from the problem associated to the
election of the optimal charges ai and bi which maximize the increase in the
expected utility of banks:
(4Ui j ai;bi) = ¸Di(4Ui=Deposit) + ¸Li(4Ui=Loan) (16)
First order conditions with respect to ai and bi are:
d¸Di
dai
(4Ui=Deposit) + ¸DiQ(1 + r) = 0 (17)
d¸Li
dbi
(4Ui=Loan) + ¸LiQ(1 + r) = 0 (18)






(4Ui=Dep: + 4Ui=Loan) + (¸Di + ¸Li)Q(1 + r) = 0 (19)
Since:

















+ 2®Q(1 + r) = 0 (22)
Dividing the last expression by Q(1+r) and rearranging terms, yields an















j=1 bj=Nbi. These are simple
speci¯cations and results are identical to the case when elastic demand functions are used.
30B Econometric Appendix
The econometric estimation used in this paper was performed in two steps.
In the second step, the pure margin was estimated as a function of market
power and interest rate volatility using Recursive OLS estimates, in order to
capture the evolution in time of market power. In the ¯rst step an unbalanced
panel was estimated using ¯xed e®ects with a time-varying intercept. The
objective of this estimation was to obtain a series for the pure spread (the
intercept in the regression) that would be used afterwards as the dependent
variable of the second step model.




0xit + ¹it (24)
i = 1;::::;N; t = 1;::::;T
where ¯0 is a 1xK vector of constants and ®¤
t is a 1x1 scalar constant
representing the e®ects of those variables peculiar to the t ¡ th period, but
common across individuals. The error term measures the e®ects of the omit-

































(xit ¡ ¹ xt)(yit ¡ ¹ yt) ] (27)
31Only the means of cross-sectional observations need to be found for each
time unit. Then, the variables are transformed by subtracting out the ap-
propriate cross-section mean and then the Least Squares Method is applied
to the transformed data. Finally, the covariance matrix is calculated as:







(xit ¡ ¹ xt)(xit ¡ ¹ xt)
0 ]
¡1] (28)
32